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Case Studies of African Agricultural
Biotechnology Regulation: Precautionary and
Harmonized Policy-Making in the Wake of the
Cartagena Protocol and the AU Model Law
R. NELSON GODFREY
I. INTRODUCTION
In spite of increased, targeted investment in agricultural
development across the African continent, production levels continue to
lag and approximately one third of sub-Saharan Africa’s population is
still chronically hungry.1 The reasons are numerous. Limited technical
and scientific research capacity for crop improvement, skilled labor
shortages, pricing and distribution problems, and environmental stresses
all contribute to the problem. The stakes are high. As Malawi’s
President, Bingu wa Mutharika, said on accepting the position of
Chairman of the Africa Union (AU) Assembly in 2010: “One challenge
we all face is poverty, hunger and malnutrition of large populations. . . .
I would therefore request the AU Assembly to share the dream that five
years from now no child in Africa should die of hunger and
malnutrition. No child should go to bed hungry.”2
“Biotechnology”3-based crop technologies have long been lauded
as having the potential to help make agricultural production cheaper and
easier on farmers,4 and have enjoyed a widespread and rapid rise. In
 B.Sc.Hons., University of Saskatchewan 2007; JD, University of British Columbia 2011. The
author is affiliated with the UBC Intellectual Property & Policy Research Group and has written
extensively on intellectual property issues, as well as Canadian and international governance
problems. The author would like to thank Emily Marden for her helpful comments.
1. Kevin J.A. Thomas & Tukufu Zuberi, Demographic Change, the IMPACT Model, and
Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa 1 (U.N. Dev. Programme, Working Paper No. 003, 2012),
available at http://web.undp.org/africa/knowledge/WP-2012-003-thomas-zuberi-impact.pdf.
2. Dr. Bingu Wa Mutharika, President of the Republic of Malawi, Acceptance Speech on
his election as the Chairman of the Assembly of the African Union 18−19 (Jan. 31, 2010);
Demographic Change, supra note 1.
3. “Biotechnology” is defined in The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention
on Biological Diversity, art. 3, 39 L.L.M. 1027 (Jan. 29, 2000) [hereinafter Protocol], for
instance, as the application of techniques that “overcome natural physiological reproductive or
recombination barriers and that are not techniques used in traditional breeding and selection.” Id.
art. 3(i).
4. See Marion Motarim, et al., South Africa – Blazing a Trail for African Biotechnology, 22
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 37, 39 (2004); Emily Waltz, Plant Genomics’ Ascent, 28 NATURE
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2009, 14 million farmers planted 134 million hectares of crops derived
through biotechnology, up almost 10 million hectares from 2008.5
Thirteen million of those farmers reside in emerging and developing
countries.6 Widely used crops include those modified to express broadspectrum insecticidal proteins present in Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt)
bacteria,7 and crops modified to be resistant to common herbicides.8
While most commentators agree that the crops may offer significant
productivity advantages to the African farmer,9 some critics claim that
the current generation of commercialized agricultural biotechnology
products “was designed to supplement the capital- and input-intensive
farming methods of commercial agriculture, not the low-input
techniques employed by smallholder farmers in Southern Africa.”10
Efforts are underway to change this, however. Collaborative projects are
in progress to develop crops resistant to drought and other abiotic
stresses.11 Biotechnology is also being leveraged to improve the
BIOTECHNOLOGY 10 (2010) (The emergence of genomics-based characterization and mapping
techniques have been widely recognized as having the potential to further influence and
accelerate the impact of biotechnology-based techniques); Joel I. Cohen, Harnessing
Biotechnology for the Poor: Challenges Ahead for Capacity, Safety and Public Investment, 2(2) J.
OF HUM. DEV. 239, 240 (2001). (“[M]olecular characterization and genomics expand our
knowledge of plant and livestock genomes, making new genes available that could not have been
isolated before.”).
5. See Crop Biotech Update Special Edition: Predicted Second Wave of Biotech Growth
and Development Begins, ISAAA (2009), available at http://isaaa.org/kc/ [hereinafter Biotech
Update].
6. See id. Among the top seven producers of biotech crops worldwide, five of them (Brazil,
Argentina, India, China, and Paraguay) are classified as “emerging and developing” economies in
the International Monetary Fund’s 2010 World Economic Outlook Report.
7. For an early paper discussing this invention, see M. Vacek, A. Reynaerts & H. Hofte,
Transgenic Plants Protected From Insect Attack, 328 NATURE 33 (1987), available at
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v328/n6125/abs/328033a0.html.
8. See Video: Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops, International Service
for
the
Acquisition
of
Agri-Biotech
Applications,
2011,
available
at
http://www.isaaa.org/resources/videos/globalstatusreport2011/default.asp, for a discussion of how
herbicide resistance (particularly to Monsanto’s Roundup) is present in approximately 80% of
genetically modified crops currently in the ground.
9. For opinions and data supporting the widespread adoption of Bt varieties in developing
countries, see Biotech Update, supra note 5; Matin Qaim & David Zilberman, Yield Effects of
Genetically Modified Crops in Developing Countries, 299 SCIENCE 900 (2003); see P.N.
Mwangi & A. Ely, Assessing Risks and Benefits: Bt Maize in Kenya, 48 BIOTECHNOLOGY AND
DEV. MONITOR 6 (2001) and Marnus Gouse, et al., A GM Subsistence Crop in Africa: The Case
of Bt White Maize in South Africa, 7 INT’L J. BIOTECHNOLOGY 84 (2005).
10. See NOAH ZERBE, AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY RECONSIDERED: WESTERN
NARRATIVES AND AFRICAN ALTERNATIVES, 81, 95–103 (2005); see VANDANA SHIVA, SOIL NOT
OIL: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF CLIMATIC CRISIS (2008).
11. See Ani Grover et al., Understanding Molecular Alphabets of the Plant Abiotic Stress
Responses, 80 CURRENT SCI. 206 (2001); see also Biotechnology and Food Security, FOOD AND
AGRICULTURE
ORGANIZATION
OF
THE
UNITED
NATIONS,
http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsummit/english/fsheets/biotech.pdf; see also T. Umezawa, et. al,
Engineering Drought Tolerance in Plants: Discovering and Tailoring Genes to Unlock the
Future, 17 CURRENT OP. IN BIOTECH. 113 (2006); see also Y. Wang, et al., Molecular Tailoring
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nutritional characteristics of numerous staple food crops.12 Commercial
varieties of such crops “remain on the distant horizon”13 (with a few
exceptions, such as vitamin A-enriched Golden Rice),14 but research
efforts have been promising. In the right policy environment,15 this next
generation of agricultural biotechnology products could make a world
of difference, not only for impoverished farmers, but also, critically, for
Africa’s malnourished and vitamin-deficient populations.
“Precautionary”16 attitudes have traditionally had a heavy influence
on African participation in international and regional biosafety
negotiations.17 The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the African
of Farnesylation for Plant Drought Tolerance and Yield Protection, 43 PLANT J. 413 (2005); see
also S.G. Mundree, et al., Prospects for Using Genetic Modification to Engineer Drought
Tolerance in Crops, in PLANT BIOTECH: CURRENT AND FUTURE APPLICATIONS OF
GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS 193, 193 (Nigel G. Halford ed., 2006); see also Water Efficient
Maize for Africa, PROGRESS REPORT MARCH 2008-MARCH 2011 (African Agricultural
Technology, Nairobi, Kenya); see also Pocket K No. 3L: Biotechnology for the Development of
Drought
Tolerant
Crops,
ISAAA,
available
at
http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/pocketk/32/default.asp.
12. See Dietrich Rein & Karin Herbers, Enhanced Nutritional Value of Food Crops, in
PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY: CURRENT AND FUTURE APPLICATIONS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED
CROPS 91, 91−93 (2006) (discussing possible applications including modifications that would
increase the bioavailable portion of nutrients such as Vitamin E, Vitamin A, iron, and zinc).
13. Zerbe, supra note 10, at 77.
14. See Xudong Ye, et al., Engineering the Provitamin A (Beta-Carotene) Biosynthetic
Pathway into (Carotenoid-Free) Rice Endosperm, 287 SCIENCE 303 (2000); Ingo Potrykus,
Golden Rice and Beyond, 125 PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 1157 (2001).
15. See generally R. Zimmermann & M. Qaim, Potential Health Benefits of Golden Rice: a
Philippines Case Study, 29 FOOD POL’Y 147 (2004) (noting that stable commercial lines of
Golden Rice have been developed and that critics have suggested that its widespread adoption
could make a significant impact in developing nations, but also that the technology has yet to be
widely adopted due to biosafety, trade, and other constraints); see also Kym Anderson, et al.,
Genetically Modified Rice Adoption: Implications for Welfare and Poverty Alleviation, 20 J.
ECON. INTEGRATION 771 (2004); see also Baorong Lu, Zhiping Song, & Jiakuan Chen, Can
Transgenic Rice Cause Ecological Risks Through Transgene Escape?, 13 PROGRESS IN
NATURAL SCIENCE 17 (2003); see also Harry A. Kuiper et al., Assessment of the Food Safety
Issues Related to Genetically Modified Foods, 27 THE PLANT JOURNAL 503 (2001); see also Kent
J. Bradford, et al., Regulating Transgenic Crops Sensibly: lessons from Plant Breeding,
Biotechnology and Genomics, 22 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 439, 442 (2005).
16. The most widely cited iteration of the precautionary principle is found in the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, “[w]here there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” The application of
“precautionary” approaches to regulating biotechnology products have been discussed at great
length in the literature; while this article confines its discussion of “precaution” to provisions that
limit the trade or use of biotechnology products in favor of health and biosafety interests, many
commentators have persuasively noted that “precautionary” conceptions of biotechnology and
GMOS must take into account the “risks” of not permitting trade or research in biotechnology
and of closing one’s borders to its products. See Jonathan H. Adler, More Sorry Than Safe:
Assessing the Precautionary Principle and the Proposed International Biosafety Protocol, 35
TEX. INT'L L.J. 173 (2000); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 13−34 (2d ed., 2005).
17. Protocol, supra note 3; see also African Union, African Model Law on Biosafety, AU
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Union Model Law on Biosafety are two agreements concluded in the
context of such negotiations that are notable for their emphasis on
precaution and socioeconomic considerations as acceptable bases for
the rejection of imported crops.18 To what extent have these instruments
affected the development of existing biotechnology sectors on the
continent, and to what extent will they affect the development of new
regulatory policies in nations with emerging or nonexistent biosafety
regimes?19 Have their purported harmonizing aims been achieved? This
paper presents an overview of the agri-biotechnology regulatory
schemes of South Africa, Kenya, and Burkina Faso—and discusses how
the emergence of these three nations as leaders in African plant
biotechnology, in the context of the Cartagena Protocol and the Model
Law, contrasts with the way these international instruments have been
characterized as reifying forces of precautionary, harmonized policymaking in biotechnology.
This paper is divided into five sections. Following the
introduction, section I discusses the Cartagena Protocol and AU Model
Law as instruments that purport to harmonize regulatory policies and
institutionalize precautionary decision-making vis-à-vis biotechnology.
Section II discusses the South African regulatory approach to
biotechnology, as a case study of the oldest and most successful
biotechnology sector on the continent. Section III discusses the lengthy
commercialization delays experienced in Kenya, and the eventual
passage of the Kenya Biosafety Act as aspects of a second case study of
African agricultural biotechnology policy. Section IV examines the
regulatory approach underpinning the recent explosion of Bt cotton as a
commercial crop in Burkina Faso. The paper concludes in Section V
with a discussion of the net impacts of attempts to harmonize
precautionary policy in the existing agri-biotechnology regulatory
landscape.
II. PRECAUTIONARY AND HARMONIZING INFLUENCES
ON BIOTECHNOLOGY REGULATION IN AFRICA: THE CARTAGENA
PROTOCOL AND THE AU MODEL LAW
The early success and rapid rise of agricultural biotechnology in
BIOSAFETY
PROJECT
(1999),
available
at
http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/auc/departments/hrst/biosafety/AU_Biosafety_2b.htm/.
18. Protocol, supra note 3; see also African Model Law on Biosafety, supra note 17.
19. See Status of Crop Biotechnology in Africa, Table 1: Status of Genetically Modified
available
at
(GM)
Crops
in
Africa,
NEPAD,
http://www.nepadbiosafety.net/subjects/biotechnology/status-of-crop-biotechnology-in-africa
[hereinafter NEPAD Biotech]. According to the African Biosafety Network of Expertise (ABNE),
there are over 20 African nations whose National Biosafety Frameworks may be characterized as
“works in progress” and approximately 10 nations that have no National Biosafety Frameworks at
all.
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North American markets has been well-documented. Policymakers,
farmers, and consumers in many less developed countries, by contrast,
have responded to the technology with far more reticence.20 Three
reasons are worth briefly mentioning: first, the general safety of
biotechnology-based crops and their impact on biodiversity have been a
subject of much debate amongst farmers and regulators in many
developing nations;21 second, modified crops have historically been
subject to significant trade barriers (relative to conventionally-bred
varieties) in important trading partners of many African nations;22 and
third, many first-generation agri-biotech products were developed by
companies accused of pursuing broad international intellectual property
protections to the purported detriment of entities, including the seedsaving farmer23 and agricultural research centers that rely upon the
ready availability of plant germplasm.24
20. Doreen Mnyulwa & Julius Mugwagwa, Agricultural Biotechnology in Southern Africa:
A Regional Synthesis, in BIOTECHNOLOGY, AGRIC., AND FOOD SECURITY IN S. AFR. 13, 29
(Steven Were Omano & Klaus von Grebmer eds., 2005).
21. A short list of commonly-listed fears about the safety of plant biotech products includes:
long-term consumption by humans or animals (particularly as a dietary staple) could have
deleterious effects on them; proliferation of agricultural products with relative fitness advantages
could out-compete traditional varieties or breed with them via cross pollination; engineered genes
could spread to related species with deleterious consequences; and resistance to herbicides
(Roundup) and pesticides (Bt toxin) could develop in response to their increased environmental
presence. For early and influential articles discussing these risks and others, see Paul Berg, et al.,
Potential Biohazards of Recombinant DNA Molecule, 185 SCIENCE 303 (1974); see also James
Tiedje, et al., The Planned Introduction of Genetically Engineered Organisms: Ecological
Considerations and Recommendations, 70(2) ECOLOGY 297, 299 (1989); see also Philip J. Dale,
Spread of Engineered Genes to Wild Relatives, 100 PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 13, 15 (1992); but see
A.B. Salifu, The Role of Biotechnology in Meeting the Biodiversity Conservation Challenge of
Africa, ASPECTS OF AFRICAN BIODIVERSITY 58 (Jacob Midiwo ed., 2010), where the author notes
that biotechnology could be used as a tool to help preserve biodiversity, if the appropriate
scientific capacity is in place.
22. See Mnyulwa & Julius Mugwagwa, supra note 20, at 29. As a result, many farmers and
regulators have held the view that the appearance of potential “contamination” of traditional
varieties by transgenic seed could disproportionately affect the trade prospects of those traditional
varieties; see also S. Herrera, Syngenta’s Gaff Embarrasses Industry and White House, 23
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 755 (2005). A prominent and well-publicized example is the
StarLink™ case, where modified corn approved solely as animal feed was detected in US
shipments destined for human consumption; see also J.L. Fox, Puzzling Industry Response to
PodiGene Fiasco, 21 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 3 (2003).
23. See Monsanto v. Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.C. 34 (Can.) (the Canadian patent infringement
case); see also VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE
(1997); A.G. Gold, Vanishing Seeds’ Cyclicality, 8(3) J. OF MATERIAL CULTURE 255 (2003).
24. For more details on the relevance of IP to open sharing of technical property in and
among agricultural research centers, see Emily Marden & R. Nelson Godfrey, Intellectual
Property and Sharing Regimes in Agricultural Genomics: Finding the Right Balance for
Innovation, 17(2) DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 369 (2012); but see Joel I. Cohen & Robert Paarlberg,
Explaining Restricted Approval and Availability of GM Crops in Developing Countries, 4
AGBIOTECHNET 1–3 (2002), for a compelling argument that the enforcement of intellectual
property rights alone cannot explain the slow uptake of biotechnological crops in developing
nations.
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These considerations resonated with policymakers in numerous
African nations, many of whom adopted precautionary policies in the
1990s and early 2000s governing the importation and development of
biotechnology products.25 Some such nations—according to several
commentators, particularly those heavily influenced by NGOs and
European trade policy26—implemented regulatory strategies that
characterized biotechnology products as inherently hazardous, subject
to quarantine, post-import milling, or outright rejection.27 To this day,
restrictive policies and suspicious attitudes towards biotechnology
remain deeply ingrained in some nations.28
These same hesitations and suspicions are arguably reflected in
regional and international negotiations on the subject of modified
organisms and in international instruments on the subject such as the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the African Union’s Model Law
on Biosafety.
A. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
The Cartagena Protocol—a product of the Convention on
Biological Diversity’s explicit focus on “living modified organisms”29—
is the most authoritative international agreement on the subject of
biosafety and living biotechnology products.30 The Protocol is a nonmandatory agreement that supplies model policies for policymakers,
25. See generally The Need for Biosafety Regulatory Systems, NEPAD (2010),
http://www.nepadbiosafety.net/about/need-for-biosafety-regulatory-systems.
26. See ROBERT PAARLBERG, STARVED FOR SCIENCE: HOW BIOTECHNOLOGY IS BEING
KEPT OUT OF AFRICA Ch. 4 (2008).
27. In the midst of a 2002–2003 famine, for example, the governments of Zambia and
Zimbabwe rejected food aid from the United States as “genetically altered” and “toxic” because
GM seed in the shipments could not be distinguished from non-GM seed. See generally Jennifer
A. Thomson, Regulatory Regimes for GE Crops in Africa, in GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS:
INTERIM POLICIES, UNCERTAIN LEGIS. 265 (Iain Taylor ed., 2007); see also Declan Walsh,
America Finds Ready Market for Genetically Modified Food: The Hungry, THE INDEPENDENT,
Mar. 30, 2000.
28. See Al-Amani Mutarubukwa, Strict Bio-Safety Law Stalls GM Maize Trials, AATF,
available at http://www.aatf-africa.org/. Zambia maintains its ban on products of agricultural
biotechnology, to this day.
29. Convention on Biological Diversity of the United Nations Conference on the
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. ST/DPI/1307 (June 5, 1992) (entered into force Dec.
29, 1993) reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818 [hereinafter CBD], Article 8(g), at 6. (“Each party shall, as
far as possible and where appropriate . . . [e]stablish or maintain means to regulate, manage or
control the risks associated with the use and release of living modified organisms resulting from
biotechnology which are likely to have adverse environmental impacts that could affect the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.”).
30. Protocol, supra note 3. As of February 2013, 166 nations are party to the Protocol,
including many large producers of biotechnology products. See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,
Parties to the Protocol and Signature and Ratification of the Supplementary Protocol,
CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (last visited Mar. 23 2013), available at
http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/parties/.
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and while it leaves decisions on appropriate safety standards to national
discretion, it represents an attempt to codify international consensus on
“living modified organisms” (“LMOs”) and their impact on biosafety.31
The regulatory provisions of the Cartagena Protocol are triggered by
LMOs32 that “may have adverse effects on the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to
human health.”33 The focus on LMOs distinguishes the Protocol from
other relevant international instruments (including, e.g., the CBD and
WTO agreements), and has the effect of separating plant biotechnology
from traditional techniques as an area that “countries have decided
needs collective actions on a global scale.”34
The Protocol focuses on two categories of LMOs, those intended
for unconfined environmental release, governed by the advanced
informed agreement (“AIA”) procedure, and those intended for
consumption as food or feed products (“LMOs-FFP”).35 The AIA
procedure is intended to ensure that importing countries are informed of
the potential risks associated with the proliferation of LMOs and that
they have the opportunity to refuse their entry.36 It mandates that
exporters notify importers of impending trans-boundary movement of
LMOs prior to the first instance of that movement and provide them
with all relevant and available information on their safety.37 The
provisions dealing with LMOs-FFP are similarly worded, differing
mainly in procedural steps for the transboundary movement of LMOs.
The establishment of national risk assessment standards for
LMOs is left to the sovereign discretion of parties, but generally,
assessments must be performed “in a scientifically sound manner . . .
and [take] into account recognized risk assessment techniques.”38
Importantly, regulators may take relevant socio-economic
31. See G. Jaffe, Implementing the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol Through National
Biosafety Regulatory Systems: An Analysis of Key Unresolved Issues, 5 J. OF PUB. AFF. 299, 304
(2005).
32. Defined as “any living organism that possesses a novel combination of genetic material
obtained through the use of modern biotechnology,” Protocol, supra note 3, art. 3(g). “Living
organism,” in this context, refers to “any biological entity capable of transferring or replicating
genetic material, including sterile organisms, viruses and viroids” and “biotechnology” is defined
as stated in note 3.
33. Id. art. 4 (emphasis added).
34. Jaffe, supra note 31, at 301.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Protocol, supra note 3, Annex 1. These include the characteristics of the organism and
parental or donor organisms, centers of origin and genetic diversity, intended use of the
organisms or products thereof, suggested methods for handling and use, and the regulatory status
of the product in the country of export.
38. Id. art. 15(1). LMOs should also be assessed on a case-by-case basis, id. at Annex III.6,
and risks should be evaluated in the context of the likely receiving environment, id. at Annex
III.5.
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considerations into account in making regulatory decisions at their
discretion.39 The Protocol also contains novel, broad expressions of the
precautionary principle within its operational sections, particularly
when compared with the imprecise provisions of the Convention on
Biological Diversity and other relevant agreements.40 Article 10 of the
Protocol states that “[l]ack of scientific certainty due to insufficient
relevant scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of
the potential adverse effects . . . shall not prevent that Party from taking
a decision, as appropriate, with regard to the import of the living
modified organism in question . . . in order to avoid or minimize such
potential adverse effects.”41
Due to the potential breadth of provisions that may be engaged in
the absence of factual justification (i.e., taking decisions to mitigate
potential adverse effects when compared with, for example, threats of
serious or irreversible damage, which is the standard used in Principle
15 of the Rio Declaration and the Preamble of the CBD) and the
inclusion of the aforementioned expressions of the precautionary
principle, numerous commentators concluded that the Protocol’s
provisions support the adoption of harmonized, precautionary measures
unique to regulating living biotechnology products.42 Commentators
also worried that widespread adoption of the Protocol could result in
potential consumer risks being emphasized over trade interests and the
progress of biotechnology research.43 Because the “African Group” of
countries from the continent collectively emphasized the uncertainties
associated with biotechnology at the negotiating table and argued
vociferously in favor of national biosafety interests, it is understandable
that many such commentators feared that precautionary stances (and
iterations of the precautionary principle) would continue to define
African national approaches to biotechnology in the wake of the
39. See id. art. 26(1).
40. See Protocol, supra note 3; see also Laurence Graff, The Precautionary Principle, in
THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY: RECONCILING TRADE AND BIOTECHNOLOGY WITH
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT? 410, 410–11, 17 (Christoph Bail, Robert Falkner & Helen
Marquard eds., 2002).
41. Protocol, supra note 3, art. 10(6). Article 11 of the Protocol uses virtually identical
language but focuses instead on LMO-FFPs. See also id. at Annex III.4: “Lack of scientific
knowledge or . . . consensus should not necessarily be interpreted as indicating a particular level
of risk, an absence of risk, or an acceptable risk.”
42. See, e.g., Graff, supra note 40, at 410. See also Adler, supra note 16, at 175;
PAARLBERG, supra note 26. On the harmonizing goals of the Protocol, see, e.g., Jaffe, supra note
31; see generally John Applegate, The Prometheus Principle: Using the Precautionary Principle
to Harmonize the Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
207 (2001).
43. See PETER ANDRÉE, GENETICALLY MODIFIED DIPLOMACY (2007), at 212–13; see also
W. De Greef, The Biosafety Protocol and the Future of Agbiotech, 22(7) NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 811 (2004).
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Protocol’s agreement.44
B. The African Union’s Model Law on Biosafety
The Model Law on Biosafety of the African Union ("Model
Law”)45 was first drafted in 1999, during a lull in the Cartagena Protocol
negotiations, to provide a basis for a “harmonized approach towards
biosafety in Africa [and serve] as a model legal instrument for
developing national biosafety legislations.”46 A first version of the
Model Law was agreed upon by representatives from 28 African
governments in 2001 (subsequent revisions followed in 2006 and 2008)
to, among other things, specifically address organisms and products not
regulated by the Protocol. 47
The Model Law contains non-mandatory provisions that provide a
model for policy-makers to adopt into national legislation at their
discretion. The regulatory focus of the Model Law is similar to that of
the Protocol—genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are defined
therein as “any organism that possesses any novel combination or
expression as a trait of genetic material obtained through the use of
modern biotechnology.”48 The Model Law is not limited to living
modified organisms, and also includes material not regulated by the
Cartagena Protocol including non-living food and feed products of
biotechnology and material developed by a broader class of
modification techniques.49 The Model Law contains noteworthy
provisions on public consultation and education,50 GMO and derivative
labeling (a particularly contentious issue in the Cartagena Protocol
negotiations),51 and also states that competent authorities should develop
44. See generally The Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, The Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety: A Record of the Negotiations (2004); African Ministerial Conference on
Science and Technology (AMCOST III) Steering Committee Meeting, Context for Revising the
AU Model Law on Safety in Biotechnology, 7–8 AU/EXP/STEERING/ST/6(III) (June 6–7, 2007)
[hereinafter Context for Revising AU Model Law].
45. African Model Law on Biosafety, supra note 17; see also African Union, Revised African
Model
Law
on
Biosafety
(Jan.
2008),
available
at
http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/auc/departments/hrst/biosafety/DOC/level2/DraftRevAMLBS_Jan08_EN.pdf
[hereinafter 2008 Revised Model Law].
46. Id.
47. Id.; see also 2008 Revised Model Law, supra note 45.
48. 2008 Revised Model Law, supra note 45, art. 2. “Organism” is defined therein as “any
biological entity capable of transferring or replicating genetic material including sterile biological
entities, viruses, viroids and plasmids” (emphasis added) and “modern biotechnology” is defined
as (a) in vitro or in vivo modification of DNA, (b) in vitro or in vivo modifications of DNA or
RNA so as to change any trait of an organism, or (c) cell fusion techniques that “overcome
natural physiological reproductive or recombination barriers and that are not techniques used in
traditional breeding and selection” (emphasis added).
49. Id. art. 11.
50. See id. art. 7.
51. See id. art. 14.
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measures to create and protect “GMO free zones.”52 The focus here,
however, will be on the Model Law’s unique risk assessment and
evidentiary standards. For example, Article 8.5 reads that “[n]o
approval shall be given by the Competent Authority unless there is firm
and sufficient evidence that the genetically modified organism or the
product of a genetically modified organism poses no significant risks to
the environment, biological diversity or human health.”53
Even more striking are the provisions related to non-biosafety
factors to be considered in regulating GMOs. The Model Law states
that:
No approval shall be granted for the making, import, use or release
of a GMO unless the Competent Authority determines that the
GMO will:
(a) benefit the country without causing any significant risk to the
environment, biological diversity or human health;
(b) contribute to sustainable development;
(c) not have adverse socioeconomic impacts; and
(d) accord with the ethical values and concerns of communities and
does not undermine local community or indigenous knowledge and
54
technologies.

These provisions extend the mandate for regulators far beyond the
strict biosafety role envisioned by the World Trade Organization and
beyond even the more generally precautionary provisions of the
Cartagena Protocol. The language used in the Model Law permits the
imposition of measures that require concrete evidence of an absence of
risk in an area where uncertainty and some degree of potential risk are
almost always the norm.55 Furthermore, these provisions engage broad,
subjective concepts (e.g., “benefit”, “significant risk”, “sustainable
development”) that may be difficult to predictably define for product
developers and regulators alike. These provisions are noteworthy
because of the breadth and strength of language included to protect
African biosafety interests;56 indeed, some commentators have found
52. See id. art. 19.
53. Id. art. 8 (emphasis added).
54. Id. art. 8.7. “Socio-economic conditions” are defined as “the economic, social or cultural
conditions, livelihoods, knowledge, innovations, practices and technologies of indigenous and
local communities including the national economy”; id. art. 2.
55. See generally Robin Gregory & Timonthy McDaniels, Improving Environmental
Decision Processes, DECISION MAKING FOR THE ENV’T 175 (Garry D. Brewer & Paul C. Stern
eds., 2005); see also Joyce Tait & Les Levidow, Proactive and Reactive Approaches to Risk
Regulation: The Case of Biotechnology, 24(3) FUTURES 219 (1992).
56. See 2008 Revised Model Law, supra note 45, Preamble (“Whereas, with the potential
risks posed by genetic modification it is consistent with the precautionary principle to regulate
any undertaking for the making, import, contained use, release or placing on the market of
genetically modified organisms and products of genetically modified organisms.”) (emphasis
omitted).
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that the Model Law’s provisions regulate biosafety in a “stringent and
precautionary” manner.57
The extent to which the model provisions of the Protocol and
Model Law impact national regulation is difficult to assess in the
abstract. The general impact of these instruments as reifying forces of
precautionary policy-making, however, may be approximated by
reference to established biosafety frameworks concluded or modified
since their introduction. In the sections that follow, this article examines
the national regulatory approaches of three leaders in the African
biotechnology sector, namely: South Africa, Kenya, and Burkina Faso,
as case studies of agri-biotech policy-making in the wake of these
agreements. All three of these nations have introduced (or, in the case
of South Africa, updated) relevant biosafety regulatory frameworks
since the conclusion of the subject agreements. Furthermore, all three
nations have signed and ratified the CBD, are contracting parties to (and
were involved in the negotiation of) the Protocol, and representatives of
all three nations have contributed to the discussions leading to the
agreement and subsequent revisions of the Model Law. Thus, South
Africa, Kenya, and Burkina Faso are well placed to serve as case studies
of regulatory policy-making and biotechnology research and
development endeavors in the context of the Protocol and Model Law.
III. SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa prioritized investment in agricultural development in
the wake of apartheid, forming the Agricultural Research Council
(ARC) and investing heavily in its projects. Due to consistently high
poverty levels58 and other pressing needs, however, the government
shifted its focus away from scientific investment and lowered financial
support for the ARC and other agricultural research institutions in the
early 2000s.59 While government support for general agricultural
research has faltered, funding for domestic biotechnology projects has
increased.60 Public research institutions, joined by a fairly robust private
sector and regional entities, conduct the majority of the biotechnology
57. Context for Revising AU Model Law, supra note 44, at 25; MEREDITH MARIANI, THE
INTERSECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND INFECTIOUS
DISEASE, 201 (2006) (“[T]he provisions of the African Model Law are arguably more protective
than those of the Biosafety Protocol.”).
58. See Frikkie Liebenberg & Johann Kirsten, South Africa: Coping with Structural
Changes, in AGRIC. R&D IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE? 195, 196
(Phillip G. Pardey, Julian M. Alston, & Roley R. Pigott eds., 2006).
59. While government financial support of scientific research and development has
increased, there has been a decrease in government funding to the ARC from R337 million in
1998 to R262 million in 200. See id. at 214.
60. See Michael Gastrow, Great Expectations: The State of Biotechnology Research and
Development in South Africa, 7 AFR. J. OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 342, 345 (2008).
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research performed in the country.61
As an early leader in African biotechnology, South Africa was also
the first African nation to establish regulatory policies on
biotechnology. Biosafety requirements for biotechnology products were
first established in 1979 by the South African Committee for Genetic
Engineering, focusing primarily on laboratory safety.62 The first formal
field trials on genetically modified agricultural products were not
conducted until the early 90s, however, and consisted of applications to
the Department of Agriculture roughly outlining hazards potentially
associated with the trials.63 Due to a steadily increasing volume of
applications and the multidimensional concerns involved, the
Departments of Health, Agriculture, and Environment collaborated to
formalize the application process and collectively drafted the
Genetically Modified Organisms Act 1997,64 which was implemented in
1999 and later updated to its current version in 2007.65
The lead agency under the GMO Act is the Department of Science
and Technology (DST) and the prescribed Scientific Advisory
Committee (SAC), which advises a multidisciplinary Executive
Committee. The Executive regulates the approval and supervision of the
development, testing, production, and use of “genetically modified
organisms,”66 including the testing and approval of GMOs for release or
importation, for which the Act suggests (but does not mandate) an
environmental risk (or impact) assessment may be appropriate.67 The
Act does not elaborate on the content of risk assessments or mandate
unique analytical steps with respect to GMOs beyond imposing a
general obligation on users to “ensure that appropriate measures are
taken to avoid an adverse impact on the environment which may arise
from the use of genetically modified organisms.”68
The Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989,69 provides some
guidance on environmental risk assessments, requiring very generally
that a proposed action (in this case, the release of a GMO) be compared
61. See id. at 348.
62. See Muffy Koch, Institutional Capacity in the South African Biosafety System, in
PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON BIOSAFETY CAPACITY BUILDING IN E. AND S. AFR. 48, 48
(2002).
63. Id.
64. Genetically Modified Organisms Act of 1997 (S. Afr.) [GMO Act].
65. See Genetically Modified Organisms Amendment Act of 2006 (S. Afr.).
66. “Genetically modified organisms” are defined in the GMO Act, supra note 64, § 1.xiii,
as organisms “the genes or genetic material of which has been modified in a way that does not
occur naturally through mating or natural recombination or both,” where “organism” is defined as
“a biological entity, cellular or non-cellular, capable of metabolism, replication, reproduction or
of transferring genetic material and includes a micro-organism.” Id. § 1.xx.
67. See GMO Act supra note 64, § 5(a).
68. Id. § 17(1).
69. Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989 (S. Afr.).
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to available alternatives in terms of the extent and significance of
identified environmental impacts.70 The National Environmental
Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004 (the NEMA),71 pursuant to the
Protocol, requires that the release of a GMO that “may pose a threat to
any indigenous species or the environment” not be permitted, unless an
environmental assessment has been conducted.72 By their inclusion in
Schedule 1 of the NEMA’s prescribed categories, GMOs can be
approved on the strength of merely a “basic” risk assessment.73 This
includes generally considering the particularities of the environment in
question, the potential impact and cumulative effects of the release,
measures to mitigate those effects, and information on ongoing
monitoring and impact-management efforts.74
Set against this framework, South Africa has the most advanced
agricultural biotechnology sector on the continent.75 South Africa is the
eighth largest grower of biotechnological crops worldwide, with 2.1
million hectares of commercially grown transgenic crops currently
under cultivation.76 Bt cotton was the first biotech crop to receive
regulatory approval in 1997, and today, more than 75 percent of cotton
grown in South Africa is Bt cotton.77 Among the other Bt crops that
have been researched is white maize, which was adapted from yellow
maize varieties and is generally more consistent with South African
diets.78 Furthermore, while all varieties of biotechnological crops
currently under cultivation were developed off-continent, recent
transformation events include the transformation of maize to tolerate the
maize streak virus—the first GM plant developed entirely “by Africans,
for Africa.”79
70. Id. § 22. The Regulation also notes that the application must include a consideration of
the environment in question, the activity, and whether and how the public was consulted. Id.
71. National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act of 2004 (S. Afr.).
72. Id. § 78(1).
73. National Environmental Management Act of 1998 (S. Afr.).
74. Id. § 24(7).
75. See Mohohlo Molatudi & Anastassios Pouris, Assessing the Knowledge Base for
Biotechnology in Southern Africa, 68 SCIENTOMETRICS 97, 106 (2006). Many different measures
are commonly used to evaluate such a claim, but one widely cited fact is that South African
researchers regularly account for approximately 40 percent of the biotechnology-related
publications on the continent.
76. See Biotech Update, supra note 5, at 2.
77. See R.J. Hillocks, GM Cotton for Africa, 38(4) OUTLOOK ON AGRIC. 311, 313 (2009).
Approximately 95 percent of South African cotton is produced by 300 large landholding farmers,
while the other five% is grown on small farms of two hectares or less. The author notes that 75
percent of South African smallholder cotton farmers were growing Bt cotton as of the year 2000.
78. See Gouse, supra note 9, at 87. Gouse suggests that yellow Bt maize was adopted rather
slowly by South African farmers in part because it was developed from a variety adapted to the
US environmental and social context, reducing its marketability within South Africa.
79. See Sinha Gunjan, GM Technology Develops in the Developing World, 315 SCI. 182
(2007).
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While it has thus enacted provisions corresponding to the
Protocol’s focus on “potential adverse effects,” South Africa, via the
NEMA, explicitly treats genetically modified plants as products that
generally exhibit low environmental risk.80 The GMO Act and
Biodiversity Act mandate unique bureaucratic processes with respect to
GMOs, but those bureaucratic processes do not appear to subject the
products to more stringent standards than those employed with respect
to other products. While some crops may be subject to rejection or
quarantine due to their particular characteristics as revealed by
environmental risk assessment, a product’s transgenic or modified
character does not make it inherently more hazardous than products
developed by other means.81 By equating GMOs with traditionally bred
crops and generally eschewing process-based regulation, the South
African government has adopted a position on biosafety that arguably
supports the nascent biotechnology industry instead of following the
“precautionary” tone of the Protocol and Model Law.82
IV. KENYA
The Kenyan economy, like that of many African nations, is
dominated by its agricultural sector. Due in part to consistently low
productivity rates,83 agricultural technology and biosafety policy
development have remained priorities for the Kenyan government over
the past several decades,84 and have developed in concert as researchers
and policymakers have recognized the role that biotechnology could
play in intensifying agricultural production and alleviating poverty.85
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, well before the introduction of
statutory biosafety policies, Kenyan researchers attempted to import and
evaluate biotechnological crops (including trials of sweet potato, Bt

80. National Environmental Management Act, supra note 73, § 24(7).
81. Indeed, once the safety of a particular engineered trait has been ascertained by
environmental assessment, that trait can be freely backcrossed into other varieties without further
regulation: See Gouse, supra note 9, at 86.
82. As an example of commentary supporting this view, see Context for Revising AU
Model Law, supra note 44, at 30, where the author notes that “[i]n its broadest contours, South
African biosafety legislation has tended to follow the permissive regulatory approach of the
United States” (emphasis added); see also M.O. Makinde, et al., ROLE OF AGRICULTURAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN HUNGER AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1–2
(2007).
83. For example, critics note that Kenyan farmers produce 1.6 tons of dry, refined product
per hectare of farmland whereas one hectare of farmland in the United States produces nine tons
of product. See Cohen & Paarlberg, supra note 24, at 81.
84. See Republic of Kenya, A National Biotechnology Development Policy 5–6 (2006).
85. See Matthew Harsh, Formal and Informal Governance of Agricultural Biotechnology in
Kenya: Participation and Accountability in Controversy Surrounding the Draft Biosafety Bill, 17
J. OF INT’L DEV. 661, 661–70 (2005).
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cotton, and, most notably, Bt maize crops) on several occasions.86
Applications for field trials of Bt maize were originally subject to
interim biosafety guidelines established in 1998 by the National Council
of Science and Technology for confined trials and research on GMOs.87
These regulations were enforced by regulators generally unfamiliar with
biotechnology and its products.88 In the end, due to delays in the
processing of the application, field trials for Bt maize did not actually
commence until a full decade after the initial application, which
exemplifies some of the inefficiencies of the early system as well as the
hazards of a “reactive” approach to biotechnology regulation.89
The Kenyan Biosafety Act90 (implementing the National
Biotechnology Policy of 2006) was introduced in 2009; the legislation
was developed by the National Council of Science and Technology with
the aid of the IFPRI’s Program for Biosafety Systems and the UNEP
Global Environment Facility.91 Kenya was the first country to sign the
Cartagena Protocol at the fifth negotiating Conference of Parties in May
2000, and was heavily involved in its negotiation.92 It is no surprise
then, that the provisions of the Biosafety Act closely mirror those of the
Protocol. Introduced to “establish a transparent, science-based and
predictable process for reviewing and making decisions on the transfer,
handling and use of GMOs,”93 the Biosafety Act mandates that GMOs
may not be imported (nor may GMOs developed within Kenya be
released from confinement) without first undergoing a multidisciplinary
safety assessment by the National Biosafety Committee (NBC) and the
National Council for Science and Technology.94 The NBC assesses and
evaluates the potential adverse effects (and the likelihood of the effects
being realized) associated with the release or importation of any new
86. Id. at 663–64.
87. Id.
88. See STEVEN WERE OMAMO, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AGRICULTURE, AND FOOD SECURITY IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA 252 (Klaus von Grebmer ed., 2005).
89. See Jenna Kryszczun & Steven Were Omano, Workshop Proceedings for the
FANRPAN-IFPRI Regional Policy Dialogue on Biotechnology, Agriculture, and Food Security in
Southern Africa, in BIOTECHNOLOGY, AGRIC., AND FOOD SECURITY IN S. AFR., (Klaus von
Grebmer, ed. 2005). Id. at 251; see also Joel I. Cohen, Poor Nations Turn to Publicly Developed
GM Crops, 23 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 27, 29 (2005) [hereinafter Poor Nations Turn].
90. Kenya Biosafety Act, No. 2 (2009), KENYA LAW REPORT § 2.
91. See PBS Helps Set the Stage for Biosafety Legislation, PBS KENYA (2008), available at
http://pbs.ifpri.info/files/2011/09/pbsfs_kenya.pdf.
92. See Zachary Mankanya, Grounding Biosafety Regulations in Developing Countries, in
PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON BIOSAFETY CAPACITY BUILDING IN E. AND S. AFR. 23, 23
(2002).
93. Kenya Biosafety Act, supra note 90, § 4(c). “Genetically modified organism” is defined
therein as “any organism that possesses a novel combination of genetic material obtained through
the use of modern biotechnology techniques”, including recombinant DNA techniques and fusion
of cells beyond the taxonomic family that are not used in traditional breeding. Id. § 2.
94. Id. § 20(1).
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GMO, taking into account considerations such as phytosanitary data
from exporting countries, the characteristics of recipient and parental
organisms, the insert and its modification, and information relating to
the receiving environment and intended use.95 Different regulatory
standards exist for products destined for confined trials as compared
with unconfined release,96 and exemptions exist where experience or
information exist to conclude that the product does not pose a
significant risk.97
Imported GMOs are subject to multi-stage regulation in Kenya; in
addition to the Biosafety Act, they are also subject to the provisions of
the Plant Protection Act, administered by the Kenya Plant Health
Inspectorate Service (KEPHIS).98 KEPHIS regulations prescribe a
product-focused system with risk assessment and containment
procedures that vary significantly and which depend expressly on the
characteristics, species, and intended use of the particular product.99
Set against this evolving regulatory environment is a growing agribiotechnology research community. While commercial crops have not
yet made their way to African farmers, confined field trials have begun
for several major crops, including: two trials of cassava transformation
events; Bt cotton; sorghum; and three events of maize transformation,
including one developed under the auspices of the Water Efficient
Maize for Africa project.100 Other recent developments include
expanded research efforts into tissue culture and marker-assisted
breeding technology, and concerted efforts to develop national research
and technology capacity.101
In spite of its uncertain beginnings, Kenya has established a
biosafety system that some regard as an exemplary “role model” of

95. Id. fifth schedule, § 5. These include phytosanitary data from the exporting country, the
characteristics of recipient and parental organisms, the relevant vector, the insert and its
modification, the receiving environment, and information relating to its intended use.
96. See id. third schedule, § 18(2).
97. See id. § 28. These exemptions have been the source of significant criticism from
biosafety proponents and some NGOs, which note that the provisions could be used to
circumvent environmental risk assessment without an adequate assessment of the product’s
potential impact on the Kenyan environment specifically. See Mariam Mayet, Comments on the
Kenyan Biosafety Bill of 2008, of Kenya, AFR. CENTRE FOR BIOSAFETY (2009).
98. See Ann Kingiri & Selfe Ayele, Towards a Smart Biosafety Regulation: The Case of
Kenya, 8 ENVTL. BIOSAFETY RES. 133, 134 (2009); see also Kenya Biosafety Act, supra note 90,
§ 3(1), which notes that the requirements of the Act apply in addition to the requirements of other
relevant Acts.
99. See Plant Protection Act, (2012), LAWS OF KENYA Cap. 324 § 8(2)(a); see also Legal
Notice on the Plant Protection Import Regulation, KENYA PLANT HEALTH INSPECTORATE
SERVICE (last visited Mar. 14, 2013), available at http://www.kephis.org/plant-importrequirements-mainmenu-86.html.
100. Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops, supra note 8, at 7.
101. Id.
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regulatory development.102 Indeed, some Kenyan biotechnology
proponents, including scientists and policymakers, consider the
Biosafety Act and workable biosafety policies implemented thereby, as
“the key for advancing adoption of biotechnology” in the country,
particularly amongst farmers.103 The uncertainty and lengthy delays
associated with early biotechnology products exemplify the importance
of rapid implementation of formal biosafety policies and a continued
focus on capacity-building research and regulatory expertise at a
grassroots level.104 Further observations may be drawn from the fact
that, though Kenya has adopted policies which closely mirror the
Cartagena Protocol, its national biotechnology strategy cannot be
viewed as particularly “precautionary”; government reports have
emphasized the importance of biotechnology in Kenya’s agricultural
research strategy105 and some commentators (including numerous antiGMO lobbyists) have found that the resultant Biosafety Act provisions
are fairly permissive and favor the interests of Kenyan biotechnology
researchers (or at least do not subject research interests to those of
biosafety proponents).106
V. BURKINA FASO
Burkina Faso’s economy is heavily dependent on the agricultural
sector, with approximately 80% of the population employed therein.107
Burkina Faso is the largest sub-Saharan producer and exporter of
cotton,108 in addition to a variety of staple food crops. Regulators,
farmers, and scientists alike have generally reacted eagerly to the
possible incorporation of biotechnological crops into Burkina Faso’s
agricultural framework. Farmers had Bt cotton test crops in the ground
in 2003, well before the establishment of legislated regulatory policies
in 2006.109 Even more troubling to proponents of strong national
102. See Harsh, supra note 85, at 661.
103. See Kingiri & Ayele, supra note 98, at 137.
104. See id. at 136–37; Harsh, supra note 85, at 661.
105. See generally A National Biotechnology Development, supra note 84.
106. See Whither Biosafety? In these days of Monsanto laws, Hope for Real Biosafety Lies at
the Grassroots, GRAIN (Oct. 11, 2005), available at http;//www.grain.org/article/entries/153whither-biosafety-in-these-days-of-monsanto-laws-hope-for-real-biosafety-lies-at-the-grassroots
[hereinafter Whither Biosafety?}; see also Mayet, supra note 97, at 4.
107. See Food and Agric. Org., AGORA: Helping Burkina Faso’s Researchers Develop
AGORA
(Sept.
2010),
Innovative
Agricultural
Solutions,
http://www.aginternetwork.org/en/free_access_resource_gallery/2010_Sept_15_INERA_case_stu
dy.pdf.
108. See Cotton, HARVEST CHOICE (last visited Apr. 10, 2013), available at
http://harvestchoice.org/commodities/cotton.
109. Elfrieda Pschorn-Strauss, Bt Cotton in South Africa: The Case of the Makhathini
Farmers, GRAIN (Apr. 26, 2005), http://www.grain.org/article/entries/492-bt-cotton-in-southafrica-the-case-of-the-makhathini-farmers.
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biosafety measures, Bt crops were in the ground some months even
before temporary measures had been formally introduced.110 These
temporary regulations were concluded by Ministerial Decree, and
introduced an arguably de-regulatory stance on Bt cotton and other
biotechnological crops in the interests of promoting scientific capacity
development and foreign investment. Formal biosafety policies,
developed by the Ministers of the Environment, Agriculture,
Commerce, Health, and others,111 followed soon thereafter.
The current policy for biotechnology products in Burkina Faso,
which operates under the auspices of the National Framework, include
“Biosafety Rules” regulating the testing of Bt products. Burkina Faso’s
biotechnology policies also implicate environmental, health and trade
legislation. The National Biotechnology Agency, created through the
National Biosafety Rules, is tasked with regulating the development and
transboundary movement of “genetically modified organisms” defined
simply as organisms with genetic material modified other than by
means of natural recombination or multiplication.112 The Rules prescribe
that confined field trials are required for all new uses of GMOs,
including those intended for research, teaching, or preliminary
evaluation purposes,113 and that an environmental safety assessment
must be completed prior to the unconfined release of any GMO in a
manner consistent with the precautionary principle.114 Environmental
safety assessments involve the case-by-case classification of GMOs in
one of three levels according to their potential level of risk as defined in
regulations.115
As discussed above, environmental, health, and other legislation in
place prior to the establishment of the National Biosafety Rules was
updated thereafter with the express purpose of bringing those
enactments to bear upon biotech products in Burkina Faso. As such, the
provisions of the 2006 Loi portant réglementation des semences
végétales au Burkina Faso, which generally regulates intellectual
110. See Ronald J. Herring, Stealth Seeds: Bioproperty, Biosafety, Biopolitics, 43(1) J. DEV.
STUD. 130, 133–34 (2007), for a discussion on the difficulty of controlling the transboundary
movement of agri-biotech crops (so-called “stealth seeds”) in and amongst groups of farmers in
Brazil and India.
111. Comité National de Biosecurité, Cadre National Pour la Prevention des Risques
Biotechnologiques au Burkina Faso, ch. 1.2.3 (Ouagadougou: CNB, 2005) [hereinafter National
Framework].
112. Id. ch. 5.2.
113. Règles Nationales en matière de Sécurité en Biotechnologie, 2004262/PRES/PM/MECV/MAHRH/MS, June 18, 2004, ch. 4 [National Biosafety Rules] (“Elle
s'effectue obligatoirement après les travaux menés en milieu confiné et après évaluation des
risques.”). Confined trial conditions are delineated by regulation, and the exact specifications are
beyond the scope of this article.
114. Id. ch. 1.7.
115. Id. ch. 1.5.1 (describing confined field trial risk categories).
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property and biosafety issues associated with the production and use of
seeds, explicitly include biotechnology products within their ambit.116
The Act distinguishes between “traditional” and “improved” varieties in
a product-based manner,117 and mandates that before any new improved
variety may be released or imported it must first meet regulatory
standards of nutritional and phytosanitary quality.118 While all other
pieces of coordinate legislation (including the Seeds Regulations) are
expressly subordinate to the National Biosafety Rules,119 these
provisions introduce interesting elements of product-based regulation to
a system that otherwise expressly subjects biotechnology products of
biotechnology to process-based scrutiny.
After five years of evaluation through confined trials, in 2008,
Burkina Faso became the second African country (after South Africa) to
approve the commercialization of a crop developed via biotechnology—
Bt cotton was the approved crop in both cases.120 Other biotech crops
with confined trial approval in Burkina Faso include nutrient-enriched
sorghum and insect-resistant cowpea,121 but the post-approval adoption
rate of Bt cotton perhaps best illustrates Burkina Faso’s national
excitement for biotechnology. The planted area of Bt cotton in Burkina
Faso rose from 8,500 hectares in 2008 to 125,000 hectares in 2009, and
further increased to 360,000 hectares (or 70 percent of the total national
planted area of cotton) in 2010.122
To contrast Kenya’s experience, Burkina Faso’s example
illustrates the potentially pro-biotechnology consequences of interim
biosafety policies, if concluded in the context of de-regulatory policy
models and in the interest of improving scientific capacity. The relevant
statutory provisions exemplify process-focused biosafety regulation in
the model of the Cartagena Protocol,123 but neither those process116. Loi Portant Réglementation des Semences Végétales au Burkina Faso, 2006–10, art. 4
[Seeds Regulations] (“Les activités relatives aux semences issues des biotechnologies modernes
sont régies par la législation en vigueur.”).
117. See id. arts. 2, 3.
118. See id. arts. 5, 27.
119. The National Biosafety Rules explicitly occupy a preferred position with respect to
biotechnology products and the many policy instruments that govern their development and use.
See National Framework, supra note 111, ch. IV (“Parmi ces outils, les Règles Nationales en
matières de sécurité en Biotechnologie occupent actuellement une place privilégiée.”).
120. Clive James, BRIEF 41 - Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2009,
BRIEFS
129,
131
(2009),
available
at
ISAAA
http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/41/download/isaaa-brief-41-2009.pdf.
121. See NEPAD Biotech, supra note 19, at 12.
122. See Biosafety in Burkina Faso: Ensuring the Safe Rollout of Genetically-Modified
Cotton, USAID (2010); see also Biotech Update, supra note 5.
123. See Whither Biosafety?, supra note 106. Critics note that, in spite of the process-focused
nature of the regime, the provisions do not support a full analysis of the unique risks associated
with biotechnology and its products, and that the balance in Burkina Faso’s regulatory system is
shifted too far in favor of innovation.
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focused provisions nor the explicit incorporation of the precautionary
principle within the framework result in a particularly “precautionary”
approach to biotechnology. To the contrary, the current policy
environment contains elements of product-based regulation that have
served to underpin a dramatic and rapid rise in the uptake and use of
biotechnological crops in Burkina Faso.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The last decade has seen some significant changes in policy and
public opinion with respect to biotechnology in Africa—crops are being
more widely tested and planted across the continent,124 negative
biosafety consequences have been rare (where reported at all),125 and
countries are increasingly moving towards formal biosafety policies.
As a consequence of this movement, proponents generally recognize
that “[f]unctional biosafety systems are key to maximizing the benefits
from biotechnology while demonstrating to stakeholders and the public
that attendant environmental and health issues are addressed by
scientific risk assessments.”126 The stakes on regulatory policy decisions
are extremely high. On the one hand, much ink has been spilled on the
possible health and biodiversity concerns associated with
biotechnology-based products. On the other hand, critics suggest that
African agriculture must grow by five to six percent each year to be a
major factor in reducing poverty,127 a monumental task. Furthermore,
regulatory issues can delay the release of new crop varieties by up to
nine years and increase costs for transgenic crop approval by up to five
to eight times more than for conventional crops (between $6 million and
$15 million for insect-resistant maize and herbicide-tolerant maize, for
instance).128
124. See NEPAD Biotech, supra note 19, at 1–2. It bears mentioning that, in addition to the
case studies presented herein, Egypt also has one of the leading biotechnology sectors on the
continent; researchers have Bt maize in the ground and are approaching commercialization of
transgenic varieties of squash, white maize, and cotton.
125. See Poor Nations Turn, supra note 89, at 29; see also Phillip J. Dale et al., Potential for
the Environmental Impact of Transgenic Crops, 20 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 567 (2002). An
excellent example of the changing opinions on transgenic seed is that of the government of
Zimbabwe, which famously rejected modified food aid as “toxic” in the midst of a famine in
2002; and at present day, is one of fourteen African nations that has reached the level of confined
research on agri-biotech products and established laws and regulatory policies specifically for
monitoring their impact.
126. See Harnessing Biotechnology for the Poor, supra note 4, at 244; see also Unesu
Ushewokunze-Obatolu, Biosafety Policy, in BIOTECHNOLOGY, AGRIC., AND FOOD SECURITY IN
S. AFR. 157, 160–61 (Steven Were Omano & Klaus von Grebmer eds., 2005).
127. See Victor. O. Chude, Links Between Soil Management and Food Security in West
2
(Dec.
5–7,
2012),
available
at
Africa,
FAO
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/GSP/docs/WS_managinglivingsoils/Chunde_West_Af
rica.pdf.
128. See Peter Beyer, Golden Rice and ‘Golden’ Crops for Human Nutrition, 27(5) NEW
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African nations were heavily involved in the negotiations leading
to the Cartagena Protocol; the “African Group” of parties at the
Cartagena negotiations argued in favor of a broad expression of the
precautionary principle and broad protections for biosafety interests.129
Furthermore, participation in the resultant framework for regulating
LMOs has been widespread; over 45 African countries have ratified the
Protocol.130 As for the AU Model Law, while few countries have
adopted its model provisions wholesale, its provisions have informed
and influenced the national approaches of many African countries.131
While the agreements play a significant role in decision-making on
multiple levels, the case studies contained herein demonstrate that they
do not necessarily serve as reifying forces of either precautionary or
harmonized policy-making.
The impact of instruments such as the Protocol and Model Law on
national policy depends on numerous factors including: histories of use
of and trade in GMO/LMOs; the policies of neighbors and close-trading
partners; the character of national policy goals;132 as well as early
regulatory experiences and the identity of the crops subject to
regulation.133 These considerations, among many others, contribute to
the wide breadth of regulatory approaches that define the existing global
regulatory environment for agri-biotechnology.
To compare, while Kenya and Burkina Faso explicitly evaluate
GMOs in a category distinct from other plant products and subject
GMOs to risk assessment provisions based on their genetically modified
BIOTECHNOLOGY 478, 479 (2010); see also Nicholas Kalaitzandonakes et al., Compliance Costs
for Regulatory Approval of New Biotech Crops, 25 NEW BIOTECHNOLOGY 509 (2007); see also
Thomson, supra note 27, at 265. Thomson notes that in circumstances where regulatory oversight
is disproportionate and informational requirements are extensive, “regulatory costs might exceed
the costs of research and experimentation to develop a given GE crop.”
129. Context for Revising AU Model Law, supra note 44, at 7–8.
130. NEPAD Biotech, supra note 19, at 2.
131. See Context for Revising AU Model Law, supra note 44, at 14. For example, Kenya’s
1999 legal framework adopted the Model Law’s provisions on liability, redress, rehabilitation,
and cleanup.
132. See A National Biotechnology Development Policy, supra note 84, at 6. There are, of
course, a variety of other international biosafety and trade agreements that may affect policy
decisions with respect to biotechnology products (including the GATT, TBT, and SPS
Agreements of the WTO, and the Convention on Biological Diversity) as well as bilateral and
regional trade agreements that may further complicate matters.
133. See Motarim et al., supra note 4, at 41. The contrast is clear between early regulatory
experiences in South Africa and Burkina Faso, where interim and statutory policies were
concluded in the context of applications for approval of Bt cotton (and its associated regulatory
experience and approvals in other nations), and in Kenya, where regulators were initially faced
with applications for approval of Bt maize (which had struggled to receive regulatory approval in
other nations due to uncertainty about its safety for human consumption). These examples
illustrate to some extent the importance of prioritizing investment and conducting research on
varieties that are well-adapted to national agricultural and social conditions (and well-targeted to
consumers’ preferences).
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character, South Africa’s GMO Act mandates unique bureaucratic
processes for GMOs but equates risk assessment procedures for
biotechnology products to those of traditionally-bred crops. Kenya and
Burkina Faso are further distinguishable by subtle differences in their
respective approaches to process-based regulation—in Kenya, new
crops are subject to coordinate legislative provisions including the
Biosafety Act and the product-focused KEPHIS regulations; however, in
Burkina Faso, elements of product-based regulation are likewise
brought to bear by supporting pieces of legislation, but are expressly
subordinate to the National Biosafety Rules.134
While there are significant differences between the three regimes
analyzed herein, they are similar in that, although all three are parties to
the Cartagena Protocol and have adopted at least some measures
consistent with its provisions, none of the three nations have fully
embraced the “precautionary” tone of its provisions as envisioned by
early commentators.135 Indeed, some stakeholders have drawn a contrary
conclusion, that the “permissive” natures of these countries’ respective
policy frameworks may emphasize biotechnology research and
development at the expense of biosafety interests.136 The same holds
true for the Model Law’s espousal of socioeconomic considerations and
its risk assessment standards (requiring an “evidence of absence” of
risk).137 The anticipated impacts of these instruments as models of
“precautionary” biosafety policy-making have largely not been borne
out in any of the three nations assessed. The non-restrictiveness of the
three regimes examined herein generally underscores the broad
discretion afforded countries to prioritize national policy goals under the
rubric of agreements such as the Protocol and Model Law.
Furthermore, while the Cartagena Protocol and Model Law
frameworks represent attempts to harmonize biosafety policy-making
on an international and regional scale,138 the policy models of the three
134. See Kingiri & Ayele, supra note 98, at 134.
135. Walter S. Alhassan, Presenting the Sabina Project at the Forum for Agricultural
Research in Africa, ACCRA 7 (Oct. 5, 2011). It should be noted that the regulatory approaches
discussed herein comprise three of the most successful biotechnology sectors on the continent, to
specifically illustrate the possible permissiveness of regulations that are textually in line with the
Protocol (and elements of the Model Law). They may be contrasted with national approaches
concluded in line with the Protocol and Model Law that are decidedly non-permissive, and equate
biotechnology products with highly precautionary, “inherent” conceptions of risk. See, for
example, the policies implemented in the West African nation of Mali, one of the few regimes
directly based on the Model Law, and the interim framework implemented in the nation of Togo.
136. See id. (presented at the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa, Accra, 5 October
2011, specifically identifying Kenya and Burkina Faso as having “permissive” biosafety systems
at 7).
137. Context for Revising AU Model Law, supra note 44, 11–12.
138. See UNEP/GEF BUILDING CAPACITY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CARTAGENA
PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY 13 (2002). Recognizing the importance of effective biosafety
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nations examined herein (all of whom are parties to the Protocol and
have contributed to the Model Law negotiations) take very different
approaches to implementing their rather inexact provisions. Indeed, as
non-mandatory instruments that provide policy-making models rather
than strict standards, the Protocol and the Model Law introduce the
potential for choice. The resulting diversity of national regimes
constituting ratified or acceded provisions of the Protocol belies its
usefulness as an instrument promoting international consistency. The
same may be said for regionally harmonized African biosafety policy
and the AU Model Law.
Finally, these conclusions may contribute to broader discussions
on the role of harmonization in the context of international and/or
regional biosafety policy. There is a widespread belief that the
harmonization of regional biosafety policy (where possible) is
appropriate and necessary, in the interest of less confusing and less
expensive (for nations and product developers alike) regulatory burdens
that will better and more safely control the spread and use of GMOs.139
While such appeals are undoubtedly well-intentioned and persuasive,
national appeals for harmonization often propose a particular iteration
or approach to the issue as “appropriate” or “correct,” be it
precautionary, permissive, or something unique to an individual
country.140 Such appeals not only give too little weight to the distinctive
environmental and agricultural conditions of other nations, they are also
arguably inconsistent with the general principles of national sovereignty
and self-determination emphasized in both the Protocol and the CBD.141
While capitalizing on the regulatory experience of neighboring nations
provisions to agricultural development, the United Nations Environment Program Global
Environment Facility (UNEP-GEF) developed broad guidelines to help countries establish
biosafety systems in line with the Protocol’s provisions and in the interests of regional
harmonization; see generally PAARLBERG, supra note 4, at 129–31. Indeed, the UN-GEF spent
$74 million dollars between 2000 and 2006 to promote the establishment of biotech-oriented
biosafety policies and the development of scientific capacity in the developing world, “much of it
in Africa.”
139. General proponents of harmonized approaches include the UNEP, id., the Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS); see also Samuel E. Timpo, Harmonizing Biosafety Regulations in
Africa: Surmounting the Hurdles, in AFR. UNION/NEPAD POL’Y BRIEF SERIES (2011); see also
Munyaradzi Makoni, Africa’s Long Walk to Biosafety, AFR. FILES (Dec. 14, 2009), available at
http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=22494; see also Julius Mugwagwa, To Harmonize or
Not to Harmonize? The Case of Cross-Nat’l. Biotechnology Governance in S. Afr. 6(3) J. OF
TECH. MGMT. & INNOVATION 2 (2011).
140. See Makoni, supra note 139, where the author quotes Jocelyn Webster, the executive
director of AfricaBio, stating that “[i]f there were harmonized laws, it would become cheaper and
much better for a region like the SADC as regional countries will accept standards that are
already set in South Africa.”
141. Protocol, supra note 3, at Preamble; CBD, supra note 29, at Preamble. See also A
Comparative Analysis of Experiences and Lessons From the UNEP-GEF Biosafety Projects, GEF
BIOSAFETY UNIT 3 (2006).
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and model policies, such as those of the Protocol and Model Law, can
be useful (and is often necessary) for nations with emerging biosafety
systems and limited budgets, parties to international agreements must be
afforded the latitude to adopt their provisions to national political and
environmental contexts without having them dictated by other parties—
particularly when the legislated issue is one as contentious as
agricultural biotechnology.

